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Abstract
 I examined the development history of Japanese companies focusing on corporate 
governance and foreign investment. In this paper, I survey the features of the global 
economic system in the inter-war period with a focus on foreign investment and the 
position and role of Japanese companies in this system. 
 I have already examined East Asia occupying an overwhelming position in Japanese 
overseas investment. In this paper, I target China which was one of the most important 
East Asian countries; the focus is on China except Manchuria because many advanced 
countries ﬁercely competed in China.
 The inter-war period was a time when Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was taking 
a more and more important role in substitution for portfolio investment in foreign 
investment. Such a change was not yet at all big in Asia. The change was just beginning. 
Even in China, which for a long time rejected foreign capital, FDI finally began to 
develop after the Chinese Revolution of 1911.
 In China, the cotton spinning industry began to develop. The modern company and 
financial institutions which supported it with various forms were born and led the 
process.
 In this paper, I examined the management of Japanese and Chinese cotton spinning 
companies in the inter-war period with greater detail on China, and highlighted the 
differences in the management between the two countries’ companies. Whereas 
Japanese companies developed market-centered corporate governance, Chinese 
companies maintained the indirect ﬁnance model mainly through the use of short-term 
funds and corporate governance based on a state and a family. This diﬀerence became 
the important factor in creating the difference in competitiveness between the two 
countries’ companies.
Keywords: FDI, market-centered corporate governance, zaikabo, indirect finance, 
family business
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Introduction
 I examined the development history of Japanese companies focusing on corporate 
governance and foreign investment in Hirohiko Shimpo (2009). In this paper, I survey the 
features of the global economic system in the inter-war period with a focus on foreign 
investment and the position and role of Japanese companies in this system. 
 I have already examined East Asia occupying an overwhelming position in Japanese 
overseas investment. In this paper, I target China which was one of the most important 
East Asian countries; the focus is on China except Manchuria because many advanced 
countries ﬁercely competed in China.
 In this paper, at the same time, I examine Chinese companies which were in direct 
competition with Japanese companies. Historical study on Chinese companies has just 
begun, and insuﬃcient data still remains. However, this study is extremely important 
and I consider the historical reasons for the economic system and corporate governance 
which depend on strong national rule continues in Shimpo (2009) Chapter 6.
 In Chapter 1, I survey the general trend of world foreign investment, and in Chapter 
2, I examine world investment in China. In Chapter 3, I examine in detail Japanese 
investment in China and Japanese companies which operated in China. I analyze 
the characteristics of Chinese companies and financial institutions while evaluating 
diﬀerences with Japanese companies in Chapter 4.
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1  World foreign direct investment in the inter-war period
1.1  British foreign investment as the largest investing country
 The inter-war period was a time that generated signiﬁcant change in the history of 
world foreign investment. During this period, the foreign direct investment (FDI) which 
is the overseas expansion of a company seriously increased in Britain and the U.S.
 In Table 1, I consider British investment in 1936. This is the latest data which 
the Economic Journal published every year and is often used in other well-known 
documents. ＊1
 
＊1  Royal Institute of International Aﬀairs (1937), however, the data of the former investigation 
years was used.
Table 1 British Foreign Investment, 1936
(100 million pounds)
Government 
and
Municipal
FDI
Total Railways Public 
Utilities
Mines Miscellane
ous
Total 
Australia 427 78 2 7 20 49 505
India and Ceylon 256 182 84 7 12 79 438
Canada and New foundland 118 325 216 26 4 79 443
South Africa and Rhodesia 103 145 21 6 72 46 248
New Zealand 131 15 1 14 146
British Malaya 6 78 4 7 67 84
Other British Territories 59 58 4 6 25 23 117
Total Dominions 1,100 881 327 56 141 357 1,981
61.1%
Europe 120 116 23 21 9 63 236
South America 139 528 362 49 7 110 667
U.S.A., Mexico and Central 
America
1 132 78 20 6 28 133
China and Japan 70 24 9 1 14 94
Other Foreign Territories 11 118 36 4 5 73 129
Total: Foreign Countries 341 918 499 103 28 288 1,259
38.9%
Total: The World 1,441 1,799 826 159 169 645 3,240
44.5% 25.5% 100.0%
Source: Kindersley (1937, 658).
32
Annual Research Bulletin of Osaka Sangyo University
 The British net long-term foreign investment in the inter-war period was 1,270 
million pounds by the international balance of payments (Shimpo, 1998, 46-7). However, 
since Table 1 shows a total of 3,240 million pounds of investment, the total amount of 
this investment does not correspond to 3,190 million pounds of Paish (1911) or 3,760 
million pounds of Feis (1930), which were two investigations just before the inter-war 
period. The amount of investment in the U.S. is conspicuously diﬀerent in Table 1; the 
diﬀerence is due to the huge decrease in railroad investment in the inter-war period.
 In the following, I compare Table 1 with Feis (1930) who investigated the 1913 data. 
In this comparison, the industrial classification in two investigations is approximately 
equal. By region, the investment in the British Empire countries was 61.1% of the total 
sum of 1,980 million pounds in 1936. Because Feis (1930) estimated this investment as 
1,780 million pounds, it tended to increase during the inter-war period. The implication is 
that the dependence on the British Empire was strengthened in the inter-war period.
 By industry, the largest investment was 1,440 million pounds of government 
and municipal investment and represented 44.5% of the total investment. It was a 
considerable increase from 1,130 million pounds of Feis (1930). The British investment 
in the inter-war period was concentrated in the countries in the empire, and investment 
concentrated on the government and municipal more than before.
 According to Kindersley (1937, 648 and 651), British FDI in 1936 was 1,920 million 
pounds, with British companies operating abroad investing 1,220 million pounds and 
companies registered abroad investing 700 million pounds. ＊2
 Considering this investment by industry the railways decreased to 830 million 
pounds, or 25.5% of total FDI. In Feis (1930), railways investment was estimated as 1,530 
million pounds. A decrease of the investment in the U.S. accounted for this decrease. 
Other than the railways, industries such as mines, commercial and industrial, ﬁnancial 
and land and investment, and oil followed; those investments amounted to 1.3-1.9 billion 
pounds. The investment in natural resources increased, with new demand for products 
such as oil and rubber. The investment in commerce and industry increased a modest 
180 million pounds. British foreign investment had a characteristically low ratio of 
manufacturing industry. This was reﬂected in the investment in China.
1.2  U.S. foreign direct investment, as the core of world manufacturing investment. 
 United States long-term capital exports in the 1920s by the international balance 
 
＊2  This category of FDI has the problem of including the loan capital in it.
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of payments amounted to approximately 650 million dollars a year in the first half, 
930 million dollars in the second half, and changed to net capital imports in the 1930s 
(Shimpo, 1998, 45-6). Portfolio investment increased in the ﬁrst half of the 1920s and FDI 
increased in the last half along with political stability. 
 U.S. portfolio investment shown in the lower part of Table 2 was 940 million dollars 
in 1914 and had increased to 7,030 million dollars in 1935, which equates to an average 
annual growth rate of 10%. It was the American Continent, especially Canada and 
South America where the U.S. invested most heavily. However, in portfolio investment, 
the magnitude of investments in the European area, especially in Germany, attracts 
attention. U.S. portfolio investment in Germany played a big role in the reconstruction of 
Germany.
 As for FDI, it was 2,650 million dollars in 1914 and 7,220 million dollars in 1935; its 
growth rate was lower than portfolio investment in the inter-war period, but it increased 
steadily.
 A characteristic of the U.S. FDI was the remarkable regional concentration with 
68.6% of the total sum invested in the American Continent. Three regions--Canada, 
Central America, and South America--received approximately equal amounts of 
investment. The investment in South America, in particular, increased rapidly in the 
inter-war period. Through FDI mutual relations between the U.S. and the American 
Continent deepened in the inter-war period.
 By industry, public utilities and oil production increased the most rapidly and showed 
more growth than the manufacturing industry. The ratio of investment on the American 
Continent in these two industries was high. 
 Of investment on the American Continent, South America received a great deal of 
investment in industrial minerals (Chilean copper) and oil production (Venezuela), public 
utilities; Cuba received much investment in agriculture (sugar); and Mexico received 
investment in oil production. The industrial composition of FDI was very diﬀerent by 
region and country. However, these investments were common at a point based on rule 
and extraction of natural resources.
 In the manufacturing industry, which was the U.S.’s biggest investing industry, 
Canada received the greatest amount. Its investment amounted to 840 million dollars. 
Europe also received much investment in the manufacturing industry. In this period, U.S. 
manufacturing, including the auto industry expanded into these neighboring, politically 
stable countries. This investment helped lead to a new era for the U.S.
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1.3  Foreign investment by the late starting country, Japan
 Unlike Britain and the United States, we have no documents comprehensively 
showing Japanese foreign investment and we have to deduce investments from 
a number of sources. Japanese long-term capital export of 1920-38, judging from 
international balance of payments, was 4,850 million yen (Shimpo, 1998, 54-5).
 Of this amount, according to Yuzo Yamamoto (1992, 165), the total of stock and 
business investment was 480 million yen in Taiwan, and 1,250 million yen in Korea, 
totaling 1,730 million yen from 1900 to 1939. The investment of 1,100 million yen 
in Manchuria in 1931 by C.F. Remer (1933, 506), and 850 million yen in 1932-41 by 
Yamamoto (Yamamoto, 1992, 145) were added, and amounted to a total of 1,950 million 
yen. Regarding the other China, we have the data of 1,710 million yen in Table 4. 
All these regions totaled 5,390 million yen. Because this amount exceeds the long-
term capital export in the international balance of payments, the estimate includes 
the investment of a slightly wide range and we can infer the above estimation is 
overestimated.
 Dunning and Lundan (2008, 174) estimate Japanese FDI of only 750 million dollars 
(by yen conversion 2,640 million yen), but it does not seem that Dunning and Lundan’s 
evaluations on Asian countries are great enough as considered in the next section.
 Therefore Shimpo (2009, Chapter 4) examined various characteristics of Japanese 
foreign investment primarily by analyzing companies operating abroad. In this 
examination, the paid-up capital of companies operating mainly abroad in 1940 was 2,750 
million yen. If an investigation cover rate is 70%, I can estimate the volume of FDI is 
approximately 4 billion yen. It seems that this methodology is an important calculation 
as a test for reasonableness of other estimations. Furthermore, through this method, 
I summarized special features of Japanese foreign investment and I will examine it in 
more detail in Section 3.1.
 On the basis of this examination, I try to summarize the world FDI. According to 
Dunning and Lundan (2008, 174-5), which is widely used, the world FDI in 1938 was 
26,400 million dollars, with 10,500 million dollars in Britain and 7,300 million dollars in 
the U.S. These two countries had a proportion of world FDI that was overwhelmingly 
high. Because total world FDI was 18 billion dollars before World War I, FDI gradually 
increased among foreign investment during the inter-war period.
 Regarding the host countries, of the world’s 24,300 million dollars, 7,500 million dollars 
was invested in Latin America, 6,100 million dollars was invested in Asia--of which 1,400 
36
Annual Research Bulletin of Osaka Sangyo University
million dollars was invested in China, India and Ceylon respectively, so the developing 
countries occupied a large part of the investment.
 By industry, primary product sector occupied about 55% in 1914 (Dunning, 1992, 
117), and this becomes the background for the large degree of investment in developing 
countries. In the inter-war period, FDI in the manufacturing industry was gradually 
carried out among developed countries, led by U.S. companies, and this promoted the 
technology transfer from the most advanced countries.
 The evaluation of the above-mentioned FDI becomes the basis of the examination for 
the present. However, we have a number of unsolved questions including the most basic 
problem of what we should consider to be FDI̶whether or not it is controlled capital, 
whether or not it is total capital, and whether or not it includes other assets. Therefore, 
the above-mentioned evaluation should be a current test calculation.
2  World investment in China in the inter-war period＊3
 In the examination of foreign investment and FDI by each advanced country, there 
was little chance to examine investment in China because actual Chinese data in the 
inter-war period are incomplete and the volume of investment in China was still quite 
minimal. However, the examination of foreign investment in China is indispensable since 
it is an important component of the foreign investment led by Japan and others that we 
review in this paper. 
 Additionally, in the 21st century, China occupies a prominent position in the world 
economy. To consider what kind of role China will play in the world economy in 
the future, looking back at the history of its economic development may yield some 
noteworthy insights. Traditional studies of modern China were dominated by analysis 
of the political field, but research on the economy and management lagged behind 
considerably. Sections 3 and 4 in this paper become a study of China’s economy and 
 
＊3  This paper examined the foreign direct investment which developed at this period and 
its inﬂuence on China, with using periodization of the inter-war period. When we examine 
each individual country, there will be the criticism that we should use the appropriate 
periodization for the history of each country. However, I dared to use periodization of 
the inter-war period because I assumed the foreign direct investment the major subject 
in this paper and examined the mutual relationship between investing countries and host 
countries.
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Chinese companies based on comparison with the Japanese economy and Japanese 
companies.
 The most comprehensive study on world investment in China is “Foreign Investments 
in China” by C.F. Remer It was translated in Japan and has been widely used. There are 
several other important studies in Japan, but none that approach the comprehensiveness 
of C.F. Remer.
 Table 3 summarizes the main contents of C.F. Remer. According to Table 3, the 
total investment in China in 1931 was 3,240 million dollars, of which 710 million dollars 
was government obligations and 2,530 million dollars was direct business investments. 
Table 3 Investment in China, 1931
(million dollars)
Total Major four 
countries
Great 
Britain
Japan Russia U.S.A.
Total Investment 3,242.5 1,189.2 1,136.9 273.2 198.8 
Government obligations 710.6 211.6 224.1 0.0 41.7 
General purposes 427.6 
Railway obligations 248.5 70.4 83.6 n.a. 15.0 
Direct business investments 2,531.9 2,260.9 963.4 874.1 273.2 150.2 
197.9 1,748.3 
(million 
pounds)
(million 
yen)
Transportation 846.3 560.5 134.9 204.3 210.5 10.8 
Public utilities 128.7 99.0 48.2 15.6 35.2 
Mining 128.9 109.0 19.3 87.5 2.1 0.1 
Manufacturing 376.3 372.3 173.4 165.6 12.8 20.5 
Banking and ﬁnance 214.7 214.7 115.6 73.8 25.3 
Real estate 339.2 316.3 202.3 73.0 32.5 8.5 
Import and export 483.7 483.7 240.8 183.0 12.2 47.7 
Geographical distribution Total Direct business investments
Shanghai 1,112.2 1,049.9 737.4 215.0 97.5 
Manchuria 880.0 812.0 550.2 261.8 
Rest of China 1,250.3 399.0 226.0 108.9 11.4 52.7 
(Hong Kong) 89.8 
Other items, 1930
Direct trade (millions Hk. Tls.) 1,153.3 170.9 543.7 74.4 364.3 
Population in China 415,576 13,015 255,686 140,000 6,875 
Firms 6,226 1,027 4,633 n.a. 566 
Ship tonnage in millions 109.3 57.2 45.6 n.a. 6.5 
Source: Remer (1933, 73, 76, 85, 86, 97, 135, 138, 143, 338, 397, 407, 506, 553, 618).
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Because the total investment in 1902 was 790 million dollars and 1,610 million dollars 
in 1914, it can be seen that investment in China increased rapidly within a short period 
of time. Particular emphasis should be focused on the large size of direct business 
investment. Dunning and Lundan (2008, 175) estimate the investment in China as 1,400 
million dollars in 1938, which is much less than the estimate in C.F. Remer, and the ratio 
to the world is considerably small. Further examination will be necessary in the future 
to more accurately reﬁne the FDI data during the inter-war period.
 C.F. Remer defines direct business investment as an investment in which “the 
property remains under foreign control and management” (Remer, 1933, 65). In addition, 
he indicates that “direct business investments ... are the chief form of foreign investment 
in China” (69). He showed that direct business investment was a new form of investment 
in this era, and because of this ﬁnding, his study is signiﬁcant. However, it is not clear 
if the deﬁnition of direct business investment is only the capital under the control, or, 
alternatively, if it refers to total capital or total assets.
 The most apparent observation from the data in Table 3 is that Britain and Japan 
were the two major investing countries based on both total investment and FDI. The 
British expand into China dates back a considerable period of time while Japan’s thrust 
came after the Meiji Restoration and Sino-Japanese War. Russia was the third-largest 
investing country and concentrated investment in the transportation industry, including 
a railroad. The fourth-largest investing country was the U.S., which had investments 
that were dispersed across multiple industries. 
 Regarding FDI, we ﬁnd diﬀerences in areas of industry emphasis between Britain 
and Japan. In Britain, the import and export business was the largest, with 240 million 
dollars, followed by the real estate and manufacturing. This reﬂects characteristics of 
British foreign investment already considered in this paper. 
 Alternatively, Japan invested primarily in transportation, including South Manchuria 
Railway, with investment of 200 million dollars; the import and export business and the 
manufacturing trailed the railroads. In Table 3, the scale of investment by British and 
Japanese manufacturing industries was not diﬀerent which I will examine in more detail 
later.
 The biggest diﬀerence between British and Japanese FDI is the regional composition. 
Britain concentrated a large part of its investment in Shanghai while Japan concentrated 
in Manchuria, with 550 million dollars in Manchuria compared to 220 million dollars 
in Shanghai. Because I examined investment in Manchuria in detail in Shimpo (2009) 
Chapter 4, I would like to focus chieﬂy on investment in Shanghai in Chapter 3 of this 
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paper. As examined in detail later, Japanese investment in Manchuria and Shanghai had 
important diﬀerences in composition. 
 I supplement foreign investment data with trade data, ＊4 population in China, the 
number of business ﬁrms, and ship tonnage. In these areas, the Japanese position was 
remarkably strong, in terms of only ship tonnage Britain exceeded. Judging from the 
little British trade with China, we can surmise that British ships do the trade of other 
countries. 
 C.F. Remer argued that the Chinese economic organization had no business unit 
capable of borrowing abroad until the modern corporate form of organization was made 
available in 1903. As a result, the success of corporate form has not been great up to the 
present time (Remer, 1933, 104). This was the basic reason to preach the necessity of 
FDI mentioned earlier, and this expansion of FDI is an important indication for China in 
that period.
3  Japanese investment in China and Japanese companies
 In Chapter 3, I examine the key role of Japanese investment in China during the 
inter-war period in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, I examine Japanese overseas companies, 
in Section 3.3, the textile companies which expanded their business into China, and in 
Section 3.4, I compare Japanese companies with British and Chinese companies. The ﬁnal 
Section 3.5 analyzes the characteristics of Japanese banks. I have already examined the 
entire Japanese foreign investment in Shimpo (2009), but in this paper I want to consider 
activities in China except Manchuria in detail.
 The 1930s were a period in which Chinese companies embarked on significant 
economic and social modernization. The powerful companies and entrepreneurs in 
Shanghai were becoming new leaders of China’s economy. At the same time, rapidly-
developing Japanese companies expanded their business into China, leading to fierce 
competition between companies from the two nations. 
 The 1930s were also marked by increasing political and military strain between 
Japan and China which ultimately led to the full-scale war. The industrial metropolis of 
 
＊4  I will examine the foreign economic relationship, for example, the trade, the international 
balance of payments and others in the inter-war period’s China again.
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Shanghai in China experienced the ﬁrst Shanghai incident (from January to May, 1932) 
and the second Shanghai incident (from August to November, 1937); these began to 
gradually inﬂuence the economic activity.
3.1  Japanese investment in China
 As summarized below, Japanese foreign investment in the inter-war period was 
concentrated on infrastructure, including the railroad in Manchuria. In contrast, in 
China except Manchuria, investment was concentrated geographically in Shanghai and 
in the manufacturing industry. The background was the difference in the economic 
development between Manchuria and Shanghai.
 Table 4 lists Japanese investment at the end of 1938 in China except Manchuria. This 
Table 4 Japanese Investment in China excluding Manchuria, the end of 1938
(1,000 yen)
Total investment 2,733,599 
Economic investment 1,709,366 Direct business investment 1,610,311 
Joint venture investment 90,374 
Loan investment 1,024,233 Central government loan investment 867,094 
Municipal government loan 
investment
24,779 
Private loan investment 129,103 
Economic investment total 1,835,573 
Mining and manufacturing 700,509 Spinning industry 408,067 
Industries except spinning industry 161,790 
Mining 120,959 
Finance business 498,378 Banking 330,324 
Investment business 160,323 
Commerce 344,131 Import-export business 260,921
Transportation and communication 120,899 Air transportation 120,959 
Warehouse and real estate and 
construction
77,625 
Public Utilities 37,971 
Agriculture & Fishery 24,116 
Spinning industry, by company, May, 1939
Shanghai Silk Manufacturing 101,304 
Naigai Cotton 82,394 
Dai-Nippon Spinning 59,517 
Yuho Spinning 30,163 
Nicca Spinning and Weaving 22,961 
Total 398,495 
Source: Toa Institute (1942a), second volume, 1043-51, ﬁrst volume, 226.
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data is based on a comprehensive analysis by the Toa Institute that complements the 
study of C.F. Remer. The total investment was 2,730 million yen, which was equivalent 
to 780 million dollars using the exchange rate at that time. However, in the second half 
of the 1930s, the yen exchange rate fell, and we must note that the dollar conversion 
investment value also fell.
 The economic investment that is similar to the concept of FDI is classiﬁed in the 
direct business investment of “the business that almost only Japanese contribute” and 
the joint venture investment of “the Japanese part of contribution in Japanese and 
Chinese investment” (“Japanese investment in China,” explanatory notes). The total 
economic investment was 1,710 million yen, the direct business investment was 1,610 
million yen, and the joint venture investment was 90 million yen. It is not clear whether 
these business investments are the controlled part of capital, total capital, or total assets.
 The largest components of Japanese economic investment in China except 
Manchuria, were the mining and manufacturing industries (700 million yen), speciﬁcally 
the investment in the spinning industry. The investment in the spinning industry 
exceeded 400 million yen and occupied the majority of the mining and manufacturing 
industries. The ﬁnance business, led by banking, and commerce, led by the import-export 
business, followed. 
 Five big companies, including Shanghai Silk Manufacturing, Naigai Cotton, and 
Dai-Nippon Spinning occupied almost all of the investment in the spinning industry. 
Regarding the activities of zaikabo, we have excellent studies in Japan that will be 
examined later. The above is the most important special feature of the investment in 
China, and after the next section, I will examine its ﬁnancial characteristics.
 I characterized Japanese foreign investment in the inter-war period as Japanese 
style foreign investment (Shimpo, 2009, 136-8). Japanese style foreign investments had 
the following characteristics: 1) chiefly invested in infrastructure, 2) led by emerging 
zaibatsu and independent companies, 3) based on the domestic financial market, 4) a 
group of companies with signiﬁcant independence, and 5) active competition with local 
companies.
 Compared with these characteristics, investment in China examined in this paper was 
diﬀerent in industrial composition. In that the form of a modern subsidiary played a big 
role; however the other characteristics were almost all common. This investment was 
not mainstream at that time, but it was a representative example of the manufacturing 
industry’s expansion overseas. It also is a typical example of the technology transfer in 
the manufacturing industry, as often found in the postwar period.
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3.2  A list of Japanese overseas companies
 Before examining Japanese companies operating in China, I want to survey general 
characteristics of Japanese companies operating mainly abroad in 1930. 
 In Shimpo (2009, Chapter 4), I made the list of companies operating mainly abroad 
regarding two years of 1930 and 1940. When we check the basic data such as capital, 
paid-up capital, corporate bonds, assets, sales of Japanese overseas companies, we 
can confirm the development of companies themselves and their contribution to host 
countries. 
 Not only in companies of all industries, but in companies of the textile industry that I 
took up in this paper, we can conﬁrm the development of Japanese companies operating 
mainly abroad, based on above mentioned data between ten years. It means these 
companies’ contribution to Chinese economic development as well as these companies.＊5 
I already examined this theme in Shimpo (2009, Chapter 4), but I have added some items 
and summarized the characteristics again.
 The ﬁrst new item was the all reserve funds, and I totaled it with the paid-up capital 
and consider it the strict deﬁnition of equity capital. Second, I list the loan category and 
make it compare to the corporate bonds. The ﬁnal item is the current income. Using 
these changes, Table 5 is created.
 Analyzing the composition of industry, railway (including South Manchuria Railway) 
was the largest industry initially. The sugar manufacturing industry invested in Taiwan 
early and this was followed by the textile industry investing in mainland China. In 
1940, the heavy chemical industrialization of Japan progressed, and overseas operating 
companies began to show similar characteristics.
 Among ﬁnancial metrics, the high equity capital ratio attracts particular attention. 
I calculated the equity capital ratio as the ratio of the above-deﬁned equity capital to 
assets excluding un-paid capital. At this time, the ratio was 48.7% for companies, 5.5% 
for banks, and 33.1% for all companies. When we add corporate bonds to the equity 
capital, the ratio of market ﬁnancing becomes extremely high. In contrast, the loan ratio 
was lower. I have discussed that Japanese corporate governance in the inter-war period 
was market-centered, and Japanese overseas operating companies had a similar special 
feature. I would like to reiterate this discussion because of its relevance to the ﬁnancial 
metrics above. Because Japanese corporate governance was market-centered, the large-
 
＊5  I will examine the contribution to Chinese economy by Japanese companies’ export in the 
next paper.
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scale financing for foreign investment was possible. The market-centered corporate 
governance was closely tied to the development of foreign investment.
 At the same time, I want to emphasize that the stock dispersion of the overseas 
operating companies was remarkable. There were only four companies--Shanghai Silk 
Manufacturing and Yuho Spinning in the textile industry and South Manchuria Railway 
and Karafuto Railway in the railway industry̶in which the largest shareholder held 
more than 50% of the outstanding shares. The average shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder in all companies was 25.8%. In 20 of 36 companies, the shareholding ratio of 
the largest shareholder was in the single digits.
 The shares per shareholder, the number of the issued shares divided by the number 
of the stockholders, was 151 shares, and there were 13 companies for which this metric 
was only in the double digits. From these data, it can be seen that not only is Japanese 
corporate governance market-centered, but the dispersion of stocks is also substantially 
advanced.
3.3  Japanese textile companies in China
 Among Japanese overseas companies, I consider six textile companies which expanded 
into China except Manchuria. These are the ﬁve companies in Table 4 and Doko Spinning. 
In Table 5, Dai-Nippon Spinning was not included because this company’s core business 
was in the domestic market. Of the six companies, four had their main oﬃce in Shanghai, 
and the top two companies, Dai-Nippon Spinning and Naigai Cotton, had their main oﬃce 
in Kansai.
 Table 6 clariﬁes the data for six companies in both 1930 and 1940. We have to pay 
attention because there were initially two types of Japanese textile companies in China. 
 The ﬁrst type was the companies under the strong control of Japanese companies 
and with their main oﬃce in Shanghai. As of 1930, companies of this type were Shanghai 
Silk Manufacturing, which was a subsidiary of Kanegafuchi Spinning, and Yuho Spinning, 
which was a subsidiary of Toyobo. In 1940, Nicca Spinning and Weaving was aﬃliated 
with Kurabo Industries, increasing the number of companies of this type to three.
 The overseas expansion in such a subsidiary form is not at all unusual in current 
Japan. However, it was not mainstream during the inter-war period. Especially in 
Shanghai Silk Manufacturing, Chinese held the roles of president and an auditor, and 
there were also a few large Chinese shareholders. These are similar to characteristics of 
current foreign investment.
 The second type was companies that established factories in China, including Shanghai. 
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Table 6 Japanese Spinning Company in China
1940
Dai-
Nippon 
Spinning
Naigai 
Cotton
Shanghai
Silk 
Manufactu
ring
Yuho 
Spinning
Nicca 
Spinning 
and 
Weaving
Doko 
Spinning
Total
Establishment 1889 1887 1906 1929 1918 1920
Main oﬃce Hyogo Osaka Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai
Capital
(million 
yen)
113.0 33.0 15.0 30.0 11.0 15.0 217.0 
Paid-up Capital (1) 69.5 24.5 15.0 15.0 11.0 15.0 150.0 
Reserve Funds (2) 42.2 29.3 9.2 11.0 2.1 11.0 104.8 
(3)=(1)+(2) 111.7 53.8 24.2 26.0 13.1 26.0 254.8 
Corporate Bonds
(million 
yen)
n.a. n.a. 12.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.0 
Loan n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.5 n.a. n.a. 1.5 
Assets 279.3 109.8 100.0 74.7 32.1 43.4 639.3 
Assets Excluding 
Unpaid Capital (4)
235.8 101.3 100.0 59.7 32.1 43.4 572.3 
(3)/(4) (%) 47.4% 53.1% 24.2% 43.6% 40.8% 59.9% 44.5%
Sales (million 
yen)
37.8 59.7 145.7 13.2 8.7 8.8 273.9 
Current Income 9.3 5.4 8.1 5.3 3.4 2.8 34.3 
Issued Shares (1000 
shares)
2,440 660 300 600 340 300 4,640 
Stockholders 15,447 2,434 40 8 916 2,585 21,430 
Shares per Shareholder (shares) 158 271 7,500 75,000 371 116 217 
Largest Stockholder Teikoku 
Life
Nakano 
Goshi
Kanegafuchi 
Spinning
Toyobo Kurabo 
Industries
Toyosaburo 
Taniguchi
Owned Shares (1000 
shares)
32.3 50.0 196.2 596.6 181.1 17.7 1,073.9 
Ownership Ratio 1.3% 7.6% 65.4% 99.4% 53.3% 5.9% 23.1%
Note: This is a list of the company founded until 1935, and its paid-up capital was 10 million yen or more. 
Source: This table is fundamentally based on Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (1941). When there is no data of the 
relevant ﬁscal year, Osakaya Shoten (1941) is referred.
1930
Dai-
Nippon 
Spinning
Naigai 
Cotton
Shanghai
Silk 
Manufactu
ring
Yuho 
Spinning
Nicca 
Spinning 
and 
Weaving
Doko 
Spinning
Total
Capital
(million 
yen)
52.0 16.0 10.0 5.0 11.0 15.0 109.0 
Paid-up Capital (1) 52.0 16.0 10.0 5.0 8.8 10.5 102.3 
Reserve Funds (2) 40.7 16.8 1.0 0.3 1.8 1.9 62.5 
(3)=(1)+(2) 92.7 32.8 11.0 5.3 10.6 12.4 164.8 
Corporate Bonds
(million 
yen)
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Loan n.a. n.a. 11.4 1.8 n.a. n.a. 13.2 
Assets 113.1 46.5 27.6 7.8 30.4 18.2 243.6 
Assets Excluding 
Unpaid Capital (4)
113.1 46.5 27.6 7.8 28.2 13.7 236.9 
(3)/(4) (%) 82.0% 70.5% 39.9% 67.9% 37.6% 90.5% 69.6%
Sales (million 
yen)
12.0 20.1 n.a. 0.9 2.5 1.5 37.0 
Current Income 1.8 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.1 6.4 
Issued Shares (1000 
shares)
1,040 320 500 100 220 300 2,480 
Stockholders 10,900 1,312 61 11 1,909 3,197 17,390 
Shares per Shareholder (shares) 95.4 244 8,197 9,091 115 94 143 
Largest Stockholder Dai-
Nippon 
Spinning 
Shusaikai
Rihei 
Kawamura
Kanegafuchi 
Spinning
Toyobo Nippon 
Cotton
Toyosaburo 
Tanida
Owned Shares (1000 
shares)
30.0 20.1 341.0 98.0 10.7 17.7 517.5 
Ownership Ratio 2.9% 6.3% 68.2% 98.0% 4.9% 5.9% 20.9%
Note: This is a list of the company whose paid-up capital was 5 million yen or more in 1930.   
Source: This table is fundamentally based on Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (n.d.). When there is no data of the relevant 
ﬁscal year, Osakaya Shoten (1931) and Osakaya Shoten (1932) are referred
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Two large companies, Dai-Nippon Spinning and Naigai Cotton, established their main 
offices in Kansai. Naigai Cotton also had a main office in Osaka, but Shanghai factories 
were the biggest in terms of the number of the setting machine, this company’s core 
business was in China. The ﬁnancial data listed in Table 6 for these companies is for the 
entire companies and not just the data of the Chinese subsidiary.
 The characteristics of these six companies are equal to the results examined in 
Table 5. First, we notice the high equity capital ratio. The average ratio of the six 
companies was 69.6% in 1930 and 44.5% in 1940. Shanghai Silk Manufacturing, which had 
a slightly lower ratio, issued a large amount of corporate bonds in 1940. The shares per 
shareholder of these companies was 143 in 1930 and 217 in 1940, which was a fairly low 
number even though they included subsidiary type companies.
3.4  A comparison among Japanese, British and Chinese companies
 Based on the above examination, I summarize a study that compared a spinning 
company in Japan, Britain and China. The examination reviews various aspects of the 
company and this section shows the machine setting number, capital and workers, and 
amount of production, based on three different studies. The Toa Institute (in column 
a) compared the data of two years. “Chinese Year Book” (in column b) was a full-scale 
study by Chinese in English. The 1937 Issue of the study was written with the guidance 
of Y.F. Liu. D.K. Lieu examined later, wrote the corresponding part in “Chinese Year 
Book, 1936-37 Second Issue,” was a representative Chinese researcher. The Column c 
was based on Yang (1940).
 As mentioned above, the excellent studies on China’s economy and Chinese 
companies by Chinese themselves were published one after another. In this part and the 
next section of this paper, I rely heavily on these studies.
 The upper section of Table 7 is based primarily on the Toa Institute and the lower 
section is based on the “Chinese Year Book, 1937 Issue.” The ﬁnancial data that I have 
already examined for Japanese companies is important, I cannot clarify the entire set of 
British and Chinese companies. Consequently Table 7 does not include these data.
 Table 7 shows that by 1936 British companies were overwhelmed and lost their 
influence to Japanese and Chinese companies. Regarding Japanese and Chinese 
companies, the Chinese companies were more heavily represented in spindles while 
Japanese companies were more heavily represented in thread-twisting machines, and 
both had same number of looms. In 1939, Japanese companies completely overwhelmed 
Chinese companies; however, other investigations (b and c) do not reach the same 
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conclusion.
 “Chinese Year Book, 1937 Issue” in the lower section shows that Chinese companies 
were labor-intensive and produced mainly yarn, and Japanese companies were capital-
intensive and produced mainly cotton fabrics. In the spinning industry in China, both 
Japanese and Chinese companies led and competed intensely while each specialized its 
products. 
 The above-mentioned Japanese companies in the inter-war period are often called 
zaikabo, and we have already had many excellent studies of their roles in Chinese 
economic development, such as Takamura (1982) and Kuwahara (1990). Prof. Kuwahara 
examined the formation of management organization, the development of engineering 
works, the development of labor management, procurement and sales, and other areas 
in detail. He concluded that the competitive advantage of Japanese companies was 
based on a “high level of productivity and quality” and their source of “management 
capability” (Kuwahara, 1980, 292 and 306). 
 This Japanese advantage in manufacturing technique and business management was 
learned directly by Chinese who participated in the activities of Japanese companies and 
Table 7 Three Countries’ Companies in Chinese Spinning Industry
Japan China Britain Total
Spindles 1936 a 2,135,068 2,694,816 221,336 5,051,220 
b 2,284,860 3,008,479 233,508 
c 2,159,568 2,690,228 221,336 
1939 a 3,481,804 1,036,669 279,596 4,798,069 
Thread-twisting 
machine 
1936 a 350,284 172,428 8,670 531,382 
1939 a 465,420 68,946 10,070 544,436 
Looms 1936 a 28,915 24,629 4,021 57,565 
b 23,127 24,861 4,021 
c 19,214 21,021 2,921 
1939 a 46,858 6,311 4,661 57,830 
Capital 1936 b tael 10,000 8,820 15,900 
(Unit: 1,000) (yen) (14,400) (12,701) (22,896)
yuan 148,151 
(yen) (152,596)
yen 356,900 
Workers 1936 b 68,683 129,216 10,000 207,899 
Yarn (in Bales) 1936 b bale 546,797 1,437,692 41,000 2,025,489 
Cotton fabrics (in 1,000 
sq. yds.) 
1936 b 1,000 sq. 
yds
633,861 358,714 43,000 1,035,575 
Note: 1 yuan = 1.03 yen, 1 tael = 1.44 yen (the end of 1936).      
Source: a: Toa Institute (1937, Vol.1, 241), b: “Chinese Year Book 1937 Issue,” 693-8,  c: Yang (1940, 192-3).
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indirectly through competition, and it contributed to the modernization of China’s economy 
and Chinese companies. The transfer of management resources such as manufacturing 
technique or business management by the Japanese companies served the same role as 
current foreign direct investment despite the political and military strain between Japan 
and China.
3.5  Japanese banks
 Whereas we determined in previous sections of this paper that Japanese companies 
adopted market-centered corporate governance, this section will examine the ideas 
Japanese banks adopted. Using the same framework as for Japanese companies, I outline 
banks’ condition in 1930.
 Table 8 considers six representative Japanese banks in order to be able to examine 
the major zaibatsu banks. Differences between the Japanese banking industry and 
other Japanese companies lead to a much higher representation of zaibatsu-related 
banks. In addition to Japanese banks, I identiﬁed the total of four representative banks 
that expanded into China--Yokohama Specie Bank, Mitsui Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and 
Mitsubishi Bank. It should be noted that the six Japanese banks were private banks 
unlike the Chinese banks to be examined later.
 When I calculate the equity capital ratio in the same manner as for non-bank 
companies, the average of the six Japanese banks was 17.6% while the average of the 
banks which expanded into China was 17.1%, which was very high. The ratio exceeded 
20% for both Yasuda Bank and Mitsui Bank, which was higher than current banks, and 
their management also was very stable.
 Next, it is important that the securities-to-assets ratio was extremely high. The ratio 
for the six Japanese banks was 24.8% while the four banks expanding into China was 
31.7%. Corresponding with this, the loan ratio was low. This shows that the Japanese 
banks were involved not only in loan business but also in securities business. As a result, 
the income of the banks was not just interest on loans, but was also comprised to a 
signiﬁcant degree by interest income from securities dealing. As was expected, this, too, 
is diﬀerent from the postwar bank.
 Finally, regarding corporate governance, zaibatsu-related holding companies such as 
Mitsui Gomei, Yasuda Hozen-sha, Sumitomo Goshi, and Mitsubishi Goshi appeared as the 
biggest shareholders for zaibatsu-related banks. The shareholding ratio of these holding 
companies was remarkably high. 
 The average shares per shareholder for the six Japanese banks was 136, which 
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Table 8 Japanese Representative Banks’ Financial Information at the end of 1930
         　　(million yen, %) 
Liabilities and 
Capital
Capital (1) Reserve 
Funds (2)
(3)=(1)+(2) Ratio To 
Assets (3) 
/{(5)-(4)}
Other 
Representative 
Account
Amount of 
Money
Ratio To 
Assets
1 Nippon Kangyo
Bank
108.8 66.1 174.9 13.6% Bond 
Issued
934.8 72.6%
2 Yokohama Specie 
Bank
100.0 117.3 217.3 17.3% Deposit 563.8 45.0%
3 Mitsui Bank 100.0 68.3 168.3 20.4% Deposit 666.2 80.6%
4 Yasuda bank 150.0 61.2 211.2 26.2% Deposit 589.6 73.1%
5 Sumitomo Bank 70.0 29.0 99.0 12.3% Deposit 680.7 84.7%
6 Mitsubishi Bank 100.0 40.5 140.5 18.4% Deposit 622.6 81.7%
Total 628.8 382.4 1,011.2 17.6%
Four banks 
operating in China
370.0 255.1 625.1 17.1% Deposit 2,533.3 69.5%
Assets Paid-up 
Capital (4)
Securities Ratio To 
Assets
Other 
Representative 
Account
Amount of 
Money
Ratio To 
Assets
Total 
Assets (5)
1 Nippon Kangyo
Bank
24.1 57.4 4.5% Annual 
Installment 
Loan
987.4 76.7% 1,311.5 
2 Yokohama Specie 
Bank
0.0 354.0 28.2% Buying 
Bill
271.0 21.6% 1,253.6 
3 Mitsui Bank 40.0 217.7 26.3% Loan 383.8 46.4% 866.5 
4 Yasuda bank 57.3 213.5 26.5% Loan 398.0 49.4% 863.4 
5 Sumitomo Bank 20.0 242.0 30.1% Loan 330.6 41.1% 823.5 
6 Mitsubishi Bank 37.5 340.4 44.7% Loan 276.3 36.3% 799.1 
Total 178.9 1,425.0 24.8% 5,917.6 
Four banks 
operating in China
97.5 1,154.1 31.7% Loan 1,261.7 34.6% 3,742.7 
Number
of Issued
Shares
Number of
Stockholders
Shares per
Shareholder
Largest 
Stockholder
Owned 
Shares
Ownership 
Ratio
Top 5
Stockholders
Ownership 
Ratio
(1,000
shares)
(share) (1000 
shares)
(1000 
shares)
1 Nippon Kangyo
Bank
2,175 37,916 57 Nabeshima 
Naomitsu
17 0.8% 73 3.4%
2 Yokohama Specie 
Bank
1,000 5,078 197 Department of 
the
Imperial 
Household
226 22.6% 297 29.7%
3 Mitsui Bank 1,000 2,353 425 Mitsui 
Gomei
678 67.8% 707 70.7%
4 Yasuda bank 3,000 13,026 230 Yasuda 
Hozen-sha
765 25.5% 1,374 45.8%
5 Sumitomo Bank 700 3,059 229 Sumitomo 
Goshi
350 50.0% 404 57.7%
6 Mitsubishi Bank 1,000 3,945 253 Mitsubishi 
Goshi
459 45.9% 598 59.8%
Total 8,875 65,377 136 2,495 28.1% 3,453 38.9%
Zaibatsu-related 
four banks
5,700 22,383 255 2,252 39.5% 3,083 54.1%
Four banks 
operating in 
China
3,700 14,435 256 1,713 46.3% 2,006 54.2%
Note: Four Banks Operating in China are Yokohama Specie Bank, Mitsui Bank, Sumitomo Bank and Mitsubishi Bank.  
Source: Osakaya Shoten (1931). 
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is equal to this metric for non-bank companies we analyzed earlier. The shares per 
shareholder for the four zaibatsu-related banks was a much higher level of 255 when 
compared with the six Japanese banks. In addition, regarding the shareholding ratio of 
the biggest shareholder and the top ﬁve shareholders, the four zaibatsu-related banks 
had much higher levels than the six Japanese banks, while the ratio of the four banks 
expanding into China was almost equal to the four zaibatsu-related banks. 
 When we compare Japanese banks with Japanese companies, the inﬂuence of zaibatsu 
was relatively strong in banks, and the level of stock dispersion was low. However, we 
may still conclude that corporate governance of Japanese banks was market-centered as 
it was for non-bank companies.
4  Chinese companies and ﬁnancial institutions
 In the 1930s, many excellent studies on China’s economy and companies were 
published. Some studies were published in English. They were often translated 
into Japanese and carefully studied in Japan. Some copies were published through 
international support. I want to examine Chinese companies and financial institutions 
while utilizing the document edited after World War Ⅱ with a prewar document.
 In Chapter 4, I clarify the characteristics of Chinese manufacturing center Shanghai 
in 4.1, two representative cotton spinning companies, Shenxin and Yong’an, in 4.2 and 4.3, 
the entire ﬁnancial industry and major ﬁnancial institutions in 4.4 and 4.5, and ﬁnally, in 
4.6, the characteristics of the securities market.
4.1  Shanghai industry investigation
 Shanghai was the undisputed center of Chinese industrial development. As a result, 
the investigation of the industrialization of Shanghai provides insight into the stage 
of Chinese economic development in the inter-war period and the special features 
associated with it. This investigation was carried out by the China Economic Association 
in 1931 and the Joint Institute of the China Economic Association and the China 
Statistical Association in 1933. D.K. Lieu was one of the leaders of the investigation, and 
he edited “The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai” based on his ﬁndings.
 The investigation examined industrial statistics, including management organization, 
capital and reserve funds, and operating hours in a day, in extensive detail by industry, 
Table 9 summarizes only the important items and the important industries. 
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 In the surveys, the deﬁnition of factory changed from 1931 to 1933. In 1931, factory 
was deﬁned as “factories, employing more than ten workers or using motive power” 
and in 1933, it had changed to “the factories must use motive power and employ 30 or 
more workers” (Lieu, 61-64). This is the reason the number of factories decreased over 
the two years. 
 The cotton spinning industry and the wheat ﬂour (ﬂour milling) industry pull other 
industries apart in terms of the average amount of capital per factory and the average 
horsepower per factory by industry. In particular, the cotton spinning industry exceeded 
the overall industry average by more than 10 times in two indexes. It is clear that the 
cotton spinning industry led Shanghai industry. Analyzing the management form, there 
were many personal ownership and unlimited partnerships in the overall economy, but 
limited liability companies occupied a large part of the cotton spinning industry.
 Lieu summarizes the remarkable characteristics of the Shanghai industrialization as 
follows. First, there is a shortage of capital. “Almost all the cotton mills borrow money 
from the modern and native banks..... There is no market yet for industrial securities 
nor any institutions for underwriting them” (Lieu, 94, 95). As examined later, he 
appropriately highlighted a weak point of Chinese companies. Other factors he identiﬁes 
are small size factories, obsolete mechanization, and the tendency to import raw 
Table 9 Development of Shanghai’s Industry
Overall 
industry (1)
Cotton 
spinning (2)
(2) / (1) Wheat ﬂour
Number of the factory 1931 1,672 29 15 
1933 1,186 29 15 
Average amount of capital per 
factory (dollar)
1931 85,125 1,405,638 16.5 461,706 
1933 137,172 1,693,706 12.3 416,643 
Average horsepower per 
factory
1931 94.7 1,550.2 16.4 779.4 
1933 151.0 2,133.2 14.1 815.7 
Management form
State ownership 1931 3 0 0 
1933 4 0 0 
Personal ownership 1931 580 2 1 
1933 271 1 0 
Unlimited partnership 1931 700 3 1 
1933 443 1 0 
Limited liability company 1931 295 17 4 
1933 332 19 8 
Source: Lieu (1938, 155-157, Appendix Statistical Table).     
Note: When each table’s data does not correspond, I choose more suitable data.
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material. 
 Although these shortcomings were not necessarily easy for Chinese people and their 
government to accept, Lieu conducted his analysis in an objective and frank manner. 
Many studies by Chinese in the inter-war period, including these documents, are 
superior at in that they depict the actual conditions and they provide a solution that the 
Chinese could implement.
4.2  Shenxin Cotton Mills as a family business
 Next, I examine ﬁnancial data of Chinese companies representing Shanghai and the 
cotton spinning industry. Unfortunately, I was not able to locate an investigation or 
statistics that examined the largest Chinese manufacturing industry in a comprehensive 
manner; therefore I analyze Shenxin in this section and Yong’an in the next section. For 
both companies, published documents that contain considerably detailed ﬁnancial data. 
According to Yang (1940, 198-9), Shenxin and Yong’an were two of the top three Chinese 
cotton spinning companies (along with Dasheng). For Dasheng, we were not able to get 
suﬃcient ﬁnancial data from major documents such as “Business History of the Dasheng 
System,” and “Selected Archival Materials on the Dasheng Business Complex.”
 At this point, I think it is important to present my basic viewpoint clear about 
information disclosure of the individual Chinese companies and financial institutions. 
Regarding Chinese companies and ﬁnancial institutions, important historical materials 
were gradually disclosed after World War Ⅱ. I never deny the importance of these 
documents, and I utilize them to the maximum in this paper. However, they are 
documents edited after World War Ⅱ, and not original documents. The political 
and economic policy of the current Chinese government and the Communist Party 
is reflected in the editing of these documents. I want to emphasize that the original 
documents in the inter-war period must be published without any modiﬁcation.
 Based on our review of the published individual historical materials, we could guess 
that the published historical materials for a general investor were very limited.＊6 This is 
because indirect ﬁnance was dominant in China (as examined later), and the securities 
market was undeveloped.
 In contrast, in Japan, the detailed account of business of each company was published 
in the inter-war period and microfilms are still available. In addition, also available 
 
＊6  In “Selected Archival Materials on Former Chinese Stock Exchange and Financial Markets” 
published recently, the data for investors is found, however, the information is limited.
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are documents published for a wide range of investors, such as “Stock Annual” and 
“Stock Company Annual” based on accounts of businesses that were very detailed and 
thorough with regard to contents and quantity. 
 In the field of the historical study on Chinese companies, regarding the financial 
data in both China and Japan, many researchers were often interested in the interest 
on the proﬁt rate or the surplus-value rate. We do not need to point out the nonsense 
of the study on the surplus-value rate anymore. The examination of the profit rate 
is only a part of the examination of financial data. In this paper, I want the major 
subject to be the examination of balance sheet data to clearly highlight the relationship 
between each company and the ﬁnancial market to identify characteristics of a company 
comprehensively.
 Shenxin Cotton Mills is a family business＊7, a company structure found frequently 
in the inter-war period in China. The total capital of Mao Xin, Fu Xin, Shen Xinxi 
tong, aﬃliated with the Shenxin was 19.3 million yuan in 1932. Of its total capital, the 
investment by the Rong family amounted to 72.2%. In addition, a large number of Rong 
family members participated in management (“Historical Materials on the Rong Family’s 
Businesses,” Vol. 1, 284, 287-8).
 Table 10 summarizes the balance sheet of Shenxin from 1920 to 1936. Judging from 
the trend in total assets, Shenxin was developing steadily. However, the instability of 
the capital to assets ratio was remarkable. Especially in 1935 and 1936, the ratio fell to 
 
＊7  In China, this is often called hegu.
Table 10 Balance Sheet of Shenxin Cotton Mills
(1,000 yuan)
1920 1925 1929 1932 1935 1936
Total Assets 5,891 23,270 37,318 64,232 65,754 73,653 
Fixed Assets 4,862 15,230 19,776 41,858 50,319 49,940 
Current Assets 1,015 7,557 16,114 22,361 15,242 23,664 
Capital and Others 1,892 5,990 6,641 18,022 1,801 2,371 
(Ratio to Assets) 32.1% 25.7% 17.8% 28.1% 2.7% 3.2%
Liabilities 3,999 17,280 30,677 46,210 63,953 71,282 
Long term Debt 231 19,174 22,509 19,938 
Short-term Debts 2,618 17,275 27,461 24,567 42,716 48,258 
(Ratio to Assets) 44.4% 74.2% 73.6% 38.2% 65.0% 65.5%
Proﬁt and Loss 1,379 -3 2,985 2,469 -1,272 3,085 
Source: “Historical Materials on the Rong Family’s Businesses,” 640-1.
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approximately 3%. In place of this, the long term debt increased, and we should note 
that the short-term debt ratio was consistently high, and was 65% in both 1935 and 1936.
 When company management does not depend on market-based long-term funding, 
such as capital or corporate bonds and internal reserve funds, but depends on non-
market-based indirect funds through banks and Chinese traditional ﬁnancial institution 
(qianzhuang), business risk increases substantially, particularly when relying on short-
term funds. In this case, interest costs typically become burdensome (“Historical 
Materials on the Rong Family’s Businesses,” Vol. 1, 406), the credit-worthiness of a 
company deteriorates, and a company will continue to depend on the short-term funds 
continuously.
4.3   Yong’an Cotton Spinning and Dyeing Company as the overseas Chinese company
 While Shenxin Cotton Mills was a typical family business, Yong'an Cotton Spinning 
and Dyeing Company--another representative cotton spinning company̶was structured 
with only overseas Chinese capital (“Yong’an Cotton Spinning and Dyeing Company,” 
1). The 5,302 stockholders were spread out regionally around Guangdong Province and 
Hong Kong. Of those, the ratio of owners with less than 1,000 yuan was 86.7%, and the 
rate of dispersion was high. In addition, the ratio of the Guo’s stem family was low (Ibid., 
22-24). Yong’an Cotton Spinning and Dyeing Company was a representative company 
listing in the Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities Market in the capital scale as 
shown in Table 13.
 Table 11 shows the balance sheet of Yong’an from 1930 to 1937. Judging from the 
total assets, development was ﬂuctuating, but compared with Shenxin, the equity capital 
ratio of Yong’an is high and stable. In contrast, a total of the short-term debts that 
includes the accounts payable, the Accounts from Individuals and the short term debt 
was around the height of 50% except in 1936 and 1937. This high level of short-term 
debt was common with Shenxin.
 In the two ﬁscal years when this short-term debt ratio decreased, the proxy public 
offered bonds by the Yong’an Company was 5 million yuan. I try to show the ratio 
of the Yong’an-related company fund including the above bonds to total loans as a 
reference. The total loans almost matched the total short term debt in all years but not 
in 1936. The ratio of the Yong’an-related company fund to total loans was very high. In 
1936, Yong’an depended on the Yong’an-related company’s long-term fund. Except for 
capital, the largest part of the loans depended on the Yong’an-related company in all 
periods. This is the most important characteristic of Yong’an, which is diﬀerent from the 
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Table 11 Balance Sheet of Yong’an Cotton Spinning and Dyeing Company
(1,000 yuan)
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
Total Assets 32,561 35,235 40,918 41,114 33,376 28,860 31,978 35,931 
Account Receivable 8,075 7,685 9,230 1,527 2,331 2,145 1,629 401 
Short-term Loan 1,584 2,377 1,805 1,101 153 578 587 151 
Total Short-term Credit 9,659 10,062 11,035 2,628 2,484 2,723 2,216 552 
(Ratio to Assets) 29.7% 28.6% 27.0% 6.4% 7.4% 9.4% 6.9% 1.5%
Liabilities 19,042 20,631 26,113 26,832 19,386 15,109 18,337 12,437 
Accounts Payable 18,638 19,525 22,424 23,376 9,990 7,778 4,048 3,188 
Accounts from Individuals 5,562 3,469 5,107 2,916 
Short-term Debt 383 1,046 1,816 872 622 345 605 556 
Total Short-term Debt 19,021 20,571 24,240 24,248 16,174 11,592 9,760 6,660 
(Ratio to Assets) 58.4% 58.4% 59.2% 59.0% 48.5% 40.2% 30.5% 18.5%
Proxy Public Oﬀered 
Bonds by Yong’an 
Company 
5,000 5,000 
Total amount of Loans 19,042 24,339 16,261 11,677 14,846 
Funds by Yong’an among 
the above Loans
17,384 18,314 13,083 9,751 5,204 
Unpaid Dividends 1,200 2,400 3,032 3,338 3,398 600 
Equity Capital 12,064 12,373 13,283 13,580 13,650 13,684 12,696 19,486 
Capital 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 18,000 
Reserve Funds 64 373 1,283 1,580 1,650 1,684 696 1,486 
Equity Capital Ratio 37.1% 35.1% 32.5% 33.0% 40.9% 47.4% 39.7% 54.2%
Net Income 1,455 2,230 1,523 702 340 67 945 4,008 
Sales 32,400 36,000 21,380 25,537 30,839 21,589 27,760 
Source: “Yong’an Cotton Spinning and Dyeing Company,” 339-42, 136, 176.
shareholding structure.
 Shenxin and Yong’an had diﬀerent ﬁnancial characteristics. However, both companies 
shared one characteristic in that their ﬁnancing from Chinese ﬁnancial and securities 
markets did not develop. Instead, they depended on an indirect fund such as a bank 
or related company, especially for their short-term funds. At this point, the signiﬁcant 
difference was that Japanese companies developed the market-centered corporate 
governance as was discussed in Chapter 3. 
 This was a principal diﬀerence that impacted the competitiveness between Japanese 
and Chinese companies in the inter-war period.
 Japanese companies in the inter-war period raised most of funds directly through 
ﬁnancial and securities market by issuing stocks and corporate bonds. The dependence 
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on indirect finance was lower in major companies. Major companies’ stock was 
dispersed widely, and their ﬁnancial information was disclosed positively. It may be said 
that the level of information disclosure was higher than that of US companies. In the 
above-mentioned meaning, Japanese corporate governance in the inter-war period was 
market-centered.
 The emerging zaibatsu which actively advanced abroad and independent companies 
in the domestic electric industry, have this characteristic remarkably. The major 
zaibatsu-related companies controlled by a family and its relatives were not dominant in 
the inter-war period (Shimpo, 2009, Chapter 1). 
 When companies can raise funds directly through ﬁnancial and securities market, to 
be more precise, they have market-centered corporate governance, companies can raise 
a large amount of funds easily, with the low cost and continuously. Companies can invest 
a large amount of funds, and can attain a rapid development, without depending on 
ﬁnancial institutions or an individual and a family.
 Most of Japanese overseas companies and zaikabo shared a characteristic of market-
centered corporate governance, shown in Table 6. When we regard the parent company 
of the subsidiary as an examination object, this characteristic becomes more remarkable. 
 Chinese companies had the following features: In Shenxin, equity capital ratio was 
very low, in Yong’an, equity capital ratio was comparatively high exceptionally, but 
it had many loans at the same time. These companies had to pay the high interest in 
those days’ Chinese ﬁnancial market shown in Section 4.2, and this became a burden on 
their management. In addition, the dependence on short-term loans made companies’ 
fund basis remarkably unstable. Furthermore, both the conditions of small and unstable 
Chinese securities market, and the existence of huge ﬁnancial institutions made these 
companies’ dependence on the ﬁnancial institutions even stronger.
 In this paper, I would like to emphasize and reiterate the signiﬁcance of this market-
based as compared with indirect funding diﬀerence.
4.4  Chinese banks
 We must examine financial institutions as the fund supply side to consider the 
finance of a non-bank company. In China, just before World War Ⅱ, there were 
statistics on financial institutions, including banks, with detailed data to survey the 
entire ﬁnance industry. This detailed data was unlike the data for the manufacturing 
industry. However this comprehensive data was only available for a short‒term period. 
The availability of this finance industry data shows how the development and the 
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modernization of ﬁnancial institutions were important for China in the inter-war period.
 Utilizing the “China Finance Yearbook” and “China Banks Yearbook,” I want to 
clarify the entire image of this industry. Table 12 displays balance sheet data of the 
top ten Chinese banks. When the necessary data was not available in “China Finance 
Yearbook,” I supplemented it through “China Banks Yearbook.” I do not include the 
data of banks’ savings section in Table 12. Even if I include this section data, there are 
some cases that the ratio of the long term debt to total liabilities falls, like the Shanghai 
Commercial & Savings Bank.
 The assets of all Chinese banks were 6,940 million yuan; the assets of the top three 
banks--Bank of China, the Central Bank of China, and Bank of Communications--were 
3,800 million yuan, representing 54.8% of all Chinese banks. These three banks and the 
ﬁfth-ranked Farmers Bank of China were all government owned and chartered banks. 
When I add the Kwangtung Provincial Bank and Kwangsi Bank, as municipal banks, to 
the four banks listed above, the ratio of government and local government owned banks 
became overwhelming. However, as examined later in this paper, since Bank of China 
and Bank of Communications were listed in the Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities 
Market, they were not completely state-owned.
 The average equity capital ratio of all Chinese banks was 7.8%, in contrast, it is 
surprising that the same ratio of the top ten banks was not high (5.2%). Central and local 
government controlled banks often have low equity capital ratio. The Central Bank of 
China was an exception with a ratio of 8.9%.
 The Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, the Kincheng Banking Corporation, and 
the China & South Sea Bank were all commercial and savings banks. Because these 
were private banks, the equity capital ratio was comparatively high. However, the short-
term debt of these three banks exceeded the long term debt. Alternatively, regarding 
the assets, investments and securities were relatively low amounts and regarding the 
loans, the Kincheng Banking Corporation had a high level of short-term loan and long-
term loan slightly exceeded short-term loan in the China & South Sea Bank.
 Even in government controlled banks, other than the commercial and savings bank, 
short-term funds exceeding long-term funds in both liabilities and assets were common. 
The development of the securities market, including stocks, was insufficient in China 
in the inter-war period so a short-term fund still played a very important role in bank 
funds. Regarding the fact that I confirmed in two non-bank companies in the above 
section, I can conﬁrm it in a bank, too.
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 After World War Ⅱ, China shifted to a socialist economy. A very interesting theme 
is what kind of development these companies and ﬁnancial institutions were pursued. 
It is likely that a full-scale study will develop in the future. It is natural that the central 
and local government owned financial institutions that grew rapidly in the inter-war 
period played a leading role in the nationalization of the ﬁnance industry itself and aided 
in the nationalization of many other industries through ﬁnance. The developing private 
enterprises and private ﬁnancial institutions lost an opportunity to develop foundations 
for the market economy.
4.5   The Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank and the Kincheng Banking 
Corporation
 Because detailed documents were published on the Shanghai Commercial & Savings 
Bank and the Kincheng Banking Corporation accomplishing rapid development as 
private banks, I want to examine this development in detail. The Shanghai Commercial 
& Savings Bank was the sixth-largest bank by assets scale and the largest private bank. 
The Kincheng Banking Corporation was the eighth-largest bank by assets.
 “Historical Materials on the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank” provides 
the most comprehensive historical material with about 900 pages, but it does not 
provide suﬃcient interesting and relevant data regarding investment. It did explain in 
exceptional detail about ﬁnancing for the cotton spinning industry in 1933, and outlined 
the fact that the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank invested intensively in Shenxin 
Cotton Mills (“Historical Materials on the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank,” 
514). In contrast, “Historical Materials on the Kincheng Banking Corporation” was an 
excellent resource with more than 1,000 pages, and it also disclosed detailed information 
about loans and investments of the Kincheng Banking Corporation.
 A militarist party and a bureaucrat owned more than 50% of the Kincheng Banking 
Corporation’s stock in 1927, but its stock became considerably dispersed afterwards 
(“Historical Materials on the Kincheng Banking Corporation,” 243). In June 1937, 
it invested 24 million yuan of its 96 million yuan in total loans into the mining and 
manufacturing industries. It invested 12.8 million yuan, more than 50% of the above 
investment, in the spinning industry. A breakdown of loan data by company is also 
included and shows that the investment in Dasheng Cotton Mills was the largest 
(“Historical Materials on the Kincheng Banking Corporation,” 368-70).
 In addition to its loans, Kincheng was also involved in securities investment, 
although the securities was on a smaller scale. We can get a breakdown by industry 
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and by company in June 1937 as well. Of a total investment of 10 million yuan, the 
investments in the spinning industry and the ﬁnance business were 2 million yuan each 
and considerably dispersed. The reference materials investigated the kind of company 
controls resulted from the investment (“Historical Materials on the Kincheng Banking 
Corporation,” 376-81) and also provided a detailed breakdown of the domestic bonds.
 We can guess that these historical materials were not widely disseminated in the 
inter-war period although they are very significant. These historical materials show 
that the Kincheng Banking Corporation had a strong intention to contribute for the 
development of entire industries, including mining and manufacturing industries and 
finance, and to develop a company. It is an important factor which stagnated the 
development of China’s economy and companies that this movement did not become the 
mainstream.
4.6  Chinese securities market
 Finally, I would like to survey the Chinese securities market. Regarding the securities 
market becoming a basis of the market economy, unlike the banks, there are few source 
documents and it is diﬃcult to clarify the entire image at this time.
 The subject of how this market was established and developed, what kind of fate it 
followed under socialism, and how it revived after the reform and door-opening policies 
is extremely important to consider in the context of the characteristics of the current 
Chinese market economy.
 Although “China Finance Yearbook” was a finance yearbook, it had extremely 
few data of the ﬁnancial and securities market. It showed the actual condition of the 
Chinese ﬁnancial system in those days well. As limited data, it published the same data 
of the Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities Market in Table 13. It showed that the 
activities of this stock exchange were accepted widely.
 The Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities Market was established in 1920. In 
1933, this stock exchange merged with the securities section of the Shanghai Securities 
and Commodity Exchange and developed its activities. It operated as shown in Table 13, 
but its activities were stopped with the Shanghai incident. As a result, the period of its 
full-scale activities was short.
 According to Shanghai Municipal Archives (1992) published comparatively recently, 
the history of the Chinese securities market began with the establishment of the 
Shanghai Stabilization Stock Company in 1882. This book also documents that the 
Shanghai Securities and Commodity Exchange was established in 1920. However, for 
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some reason, this document does not show either detailed data for the two exchanges 
or a document of the Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities Market in the ﬁrst half of 
the book when it discussed the period before World War Ⅱ.
 Through these records, we can confirm that the change in the Shanghai Chinese 
Merchants’ Securities Market was very intense during a few periods. Only the public 
bond market that had a relatively large scale was moderately stable. Because the 
issued stock of Bank of China was 400,0000 shares and the issued stock of Bank of 
Communications was 200,000 shares, if the annual average traded volume of a company 
stock was 8 million, the traded volume in this market was not signiﬁcant. The corporate 
bond market was much smaller than the public bond market so we can conclude that 
this securities market was a market primarily for public bonds.
 The average public bond’s yearly dealing of 3,200 million yuan in this table was 
approximately equal to the bank deposit of 3,600 million yuan shown in Table 12. If the 
Table 13 Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities Market
Domestic Bonds
1,000 yuan
Company Stock
1,000 stocks
Company Bonds
1,000 yuan
1932 901,710 4,338 20,299 
1933 3,182,685 8,534 51,422 
1934 4,773,410 18,453 44,059 
1935 4,909,980 898 12,437 
1936 2,335,375 9,685 16,413 
Average 3,220,632 8,382 28,926 
Representative Companies (with more than 10,000 yuan’s nominal capital)
Bank trust services Bank of China 40,000 
Bank of Communications 
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 
Public utility Chinese Merchant Electric Company 10,000
Waterworks of Zhabei Water and Electricity Company 10,000
Spinning industry Yong’an Spinning Company 12,000
Mining Zhong Xing Coal Company 10,000
Han Ye Ping Coal and Iron Company 18,666
Department store Sincere Company 10,000 (Hong Kong’s yuan)
Yong’an Company 15,000
Others Nan Yang Brothers Tobacco 11,250
Note: Regarding upper section of this table, we have data in Source 2, however some parts of it is revised by 
Source 1.   
Source 1: “The Chinese Economic & Statistical Review”, Vol. IV, No.10, October 1937.   
2: The data of the listed companies based on Naka-Shina Shinko Kabushiki Gaisha (1941), Appendix. The 
appeared companies are based on the results after 1939.   
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public bond’s dealing frequency was not so large, we may have been able to conclude 
that the public bond market developed comparatively with bank deposits. Because 
ﬁnancial institutions did not hold many public bonds, for whom and for what reasons the 
public bond was invested will be an interesting examination subject in the future.
 The Central China Development, Oﬃce of Research (1941, 58-62), which introduced 
the Shanghai Chinese Merchants’ Securities Market in detail, pointed out the reason 
why the dealing of company stocks became dull. The primary reasons were political 
instability, high general interest rate in comparison with the dividend of stocks, little 
proﬁt, the low level of liquidity, and the non-publication of accounts.
 In contrast, the same book explained why a public bond market developed markedly: 
a uniﬁcation of the public bond system, the surge of conﬁdence, possible free trade, and 
high yields. From these explanations, we could speculate that in spite of a small market 
size, various investors eagerly demanded more advantageous ﬁnancial products and the 
further development possibility of the ﬁnancial markets was hidden in China in the inter-
war period
Conclusion
 The inter-war period was a time when FDI was taking a more and more important 
role in substitution for portfolio investment in foreign investment. FDI strongly promotes 
the economic development of the host country as well as the investing country and 
investing company because such investments can transfer management resources of a 
company. Prior to the inter-war period, FDI was concentrated in companies focused on 
the extraction of natural resources and the processing industry, but the manufacturing 
industry gradually increased. The U.S. auto industry’s expansion into Canada and Europe 
began in earnest.
 Such a change was not yet at all big in Asia. The change was just beginning. Even 
in China, which for a long time rejected foreign capital, FDI ﬁnally began to develop 
after the Chinese Revolution of 1911. It was Britain that pushed forward an expansion 
to China earliest, but Japan rapidly caught up with Britain. In China except Manchuria, 
Japanese companies were particularly active in expanding the manufacturing industry, 
particularly the cotton spinning industry. 
 In China, the cotton spinning industry began to develop while importing Japanese 
and English technique, capital, and raw materials. The modern company and ﬁnancial 
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institutions which supported it with various forms were born and led the process. In this 
way, Japanese and Chinese companies competed intensely in Shanghai̶China’s greatest 
industrial city.
 In this paper, I examined the management of Japanese and Chinese cotton spinning 
companies in the inter-war period with greater detail on China, and highlighted the 
differences in the management between the two countries’ companies. Whereas 
Japanese companies developed market-centered corporate governance, Chinese 
companies maintained the indirect ﬁnance model mainly through the use of short-term 
funds and corporate governance based on a state and a family. This diﬀerence became 
the important factor in creating the difference in competitiveness between the two 
countries’ companies. In addition, the excellent technique and management of Japanese 
companies was transferred to China directly or through this competition indirectly.
 It should be noted that Chinese central and local government controlled financial 
institutions, which grew rapidly in the inter-war period, played a leading role in the 
nationalization of the finance industry itself and many other industries by providing 
financing after World War Ⅱ. In the transition to socialism, each company was 
nationalized and became a group of huge state-owned enterprises which were 
overwhelmingly dominant in China. These companies challenge a competitive world 
economy with companies, including Japanese companies, through reform, door-opening 
policies and privatization of the state-owned enterprises. The Chinese companies now 
have a new characteristic, the huge state monopoly enterprises.
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